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On August 7, 1628 the Castilian government halved overnight the nominal stock of money through the 50% crydown of
its copper currency. The paper argues that this helicopter lift of money is a nice historical experiment to put to the test the
empirical relevance of competing theories of the price level. The experiment shows how the post-crydown behaviour of
the price level predicted by the weak form fiscal theory (the so-called Sargent-Wallace theory) matches actual data better
than both the strong form fiscal theory and the quantity theory (the so-called monetarist theory).
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1. Introduction
The pioneering works of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Sargent (1982) put forward a
view of the price level determination which involves a fiscal behaviour driving an accommo-
dative monetary policy, with the monetary authority using base money growth to finance a
budget deficit. That weak form fiscal theory of the price level (WFT) assumes fiscal domi-
nance in the sense that the fiscal authority commits to a path of primary budget surpluses,
forcing the monetary authority to generate the needed seigniorage in order to maintain gov-
ernmental solvency. Therefore, the WFT has questioned the two more prominent proposi-
tions of the conventional monetarist (quantity) theory of the price level (MT), namely that (i)
money is the only government liability which can affect macroeconomic variables, and (ii)
the price level varies in proportion to the current nominal money supply. Aiyagari and
Gertler (1985) have made operational the WFT by showing how it provides a link between
the current price level and the total nominal supply of government liabilities (money and
debt outstanding) as a function of the specific fiscal-financial-monetary program followed
by the government.
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* I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.In addition, a prominent role for the nominal stock of government debt in the price level
has been more recently put forward by the strong form fiscal theory of the price level (SFT) 1
(see Leeper 1991, Sims 1994, Woodford 1995, and Cochrane 2001, for proponents; and
McCallum 1998, Buiter 1999, Kocherlakota and Phelan 1999, for critics). The main claim of
this new theory is that the current level of prices is determined by the nominal stock of gov-
ernment bonds even in cases in which the monetary authority refuses to accommodate bud-
get deficits and keeps the monetary base on its predetermined path. That is, this theory does
not claim that fiscal as well monetary policy stances are significant for the price level behav-
iour; on the contrary, it suggests that only fiscal policy is relevant and, thus, it is at odds with
both the WFT and the MT.
Which of those theories of the price level is empirically relevant? Unfortunately, eco-
nomic researchers cannot conduct controlled experiments in an actual economy in order to
see which theory fits better the data. Fortunately, history provides once in a while rare epi-
sodes that closely resemble such controlled experiments. The 1628 Castilian copper cur-
rency crydown is an incredibly good historical episode for answering the above question.
The Castilian monetary regime at the beginning of the seventeenth century was a de iure
trimetallic one (gold, silver, and copper) but since gold did not circulate, it had become a de
facto bimetallic one. Huge issues of copper currency from 1597 to 1608 and, mainly, from July
1617 to May 1626, drove silver almost out of Castilian monetary circulation by 1625. From
that year onwards, since copper coins were far away from full-bodied 2, the Castilian economy
became like a fiat copper currency one, with rising prices (in copper terms) and silver premi-
ums (market quotations of the ratio copper maravedi/silver maravedi). On August 7, 1628 the
Castilian government implemented an overnight deflationary redenomination by reducing the
legal face value of all copper currency by a proportion of one-half. After the redenomination,
the demand for real copper money balances diminished abruptly, so that both the price level (in
copper terms) and the silver premium fell much less than the legal face value.
The predictions for the price level behaviour of both the WFT and the MT after a defla-
tionary redenomination are obtained by adapting a Ricardian model to the 17th-century
Castilian economic environment. In addition, the SFT prediction for the price level in re-
sponse to a once-and-for-all decrease in the money supply (i.e. a crydown) based upon a sim-
ple monetary model is standard and can be found, for instance, in Kocherlakota and Phelan
(1999) or derived in McCallum’s (1998) model.
We define a Ricardian fiscal-financial-monetary program (FFMP) as one that, for all
prices, satisfies the government’s infinite-horizon budget constraint with equality. Following
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), it can be identified a continuum of FFMPs cases which vary ac-
cording to the fractions of the government debt backed by seigniorage and the budget pri-
mary surplus. A polar budget surplus FFMP is defined as one in which the government bud-
get primary surplus backs fully the government interest-bearing debt. In addition, we define
a polar seigniorage FFMP as one in which all that government debt is implicitly backed by
seigniorage. In this Ricardian framework, we find that apart from the polar budget surplus
FFMP, the nominal stock of government bonds matters to the economy’s nominal variables
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ticular composition of the total nominal supply of government liabilities (money and bonds).
In other words, the WFT findings are obtained if the FFMP is Ricardian and seigniorage
backs either fully or partially the government debt. Furthermore, the MT findings need a
Ricardian polar budget surplus FFMP.
The SFT is based upon Non-Ricardian FFMPs, that is, programs which are not con-
strained to satisfy the government’s infinite-horizon budget constraint for all price levels.
However, in a Non-Ricardian framework, such a constraint is derived as an equilibrium con-
dition using household optimisation and market-clearing. Further imposing a Non-Ricardian
FFMP in this equilibrium condition, it can be found that the current real value of the govern-
ment debt outstanding is equal to the present value of the government’s real budget sur-
pluses. As a consequence, a unique equilibrium price level can be pinned down as the ratio
«nominal debt outstanding/present value of budget surpluses». Hence, the SFT argues that
the current price level is directly proportional to the nominal stock of government debt and
has no relation at all with the nominal money supply. In addition, if the current price level
thus obtained is higher than the price level pinned down by the MT, the path of future prices
is ever increasing, thus giving rise to speculative bubbles 3.
Expressions for the impact on the price level of a 50% crydown of the nominal stock of
copper currency are obtained under the three theories of the price level (MT, WFT, and SFT).
Using actual fiscal and monetary data in those expressions, the effect on the price level pre-
dicted by them can be evaluated. The MT predicts a one-time decrease in the price level. In a
purely fiduciary model, this decrease would be equal in percentage terms to the decrease in
the money supply (50%). However, in a commodity-money model with free coinage of sil-
ver there exist both a minting and a melting point that impose bounds within which the price
level must stay (Sargent and Velde, 1999, 2002). As a result, according to the MT, the 50%
crydown would have reduced the price level by about one-third. The WFT predicts a
one-time decrease in the price level smaller than the MT prediction, about one-fourth. The
SFT predicts an initially unchanged price level followed by a speculative hyperinflation.
All three predicted impacts are then compared to the actual effect. It is found that the
WFT predicted impact is closer to the actual one than both the MT and SFT predicted effects.
Our explanation why the WFT fits better the data runs as follows. As of 1628, the burden of
Castilian nominal government debt was so heavy and the previous copper issues to obtain
seigniorage had been so huge that the weight of anticipated money issues —to raise future
seigniorage— on the current price level was even higher than the weight of the current nomi-
nal money stock. Thus, a crydown that reduced the current nominal money stock —while
leaving unaffected the nominal stock of government debt— diminished significantly the cur-
rent price level but much less than the proportion predicted by the monetarist theory.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the historical back-
ground to the Castilian crydown of 1628. In Section III, we describe the analytical frame-
work and derive the theoretical findings. Section IV compares those findings to actual data in
order to analyse the price-level effects following from the crydown. Section V concludes.
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After a long and turbulent period of medieval monetary history, the Catholic Kings re-
formed the Kingdom of Castile’s monetary system in 1497. The new system was based upon
three metals: gold, silver, and an alloy of silver and copper, called billon. The (abstract) unit of
account was the maravedi so that prices were quoted in maravedis. The gold coin was the
ducado, representing 375 maravedis. The silver coin was the real, equivalent to 34 maravedis.
The billon coin was named the blanca, corresponding to 0.5 maravedis. As a result, there were
high-denomination gold coins, medium-denomination silver coins and low-denomination bil-
lon coins. The 1497 regulation forbade the operation of private mints and limited the number
of royal mints to seven. It established the free coinage of gold and silver, but the circulating
nominal stock of billon was quantitatively limited and its coinage remained a royal monopoly.
That monetary system kept in operation fundamentally unchanged until a King Philip II’s
decree of December 31, 1596 removed the silver content from billon coins. Previously, the sil-
ver cost and the copper cost were each about 30% of the legal tender value of a blanca, so that
the total mint fee was about 40% (brassage was 30% and net seigniorage was 10%). This de-
cree limited the annual minting of the new copper coins to 100,000 ducados 4 and, in addition,
it mandated that the same quantity of previous billon coins be retired from the domestic circu-
lation. The nominal amount minted between May 1597 and June 1602 was 723,887 ducados.
A King Philip III’s ordinance on June 3, 1602 reduced the weight of new copper coins by a
proportion of one-half. The lighter copper currency minted between July 1602 and January
1608 amounted to 4,271,449 ducados. Moreover, on September 18, 1603 the King decreed to
have the pre-1597 billon coins restamped at twice their original face value. The copper cur-
rency arising to domestic circulation due to the restamping operation amounted to 2,302,374
ducados. After an agreement between the government and Parliament, a decree of November
2, 1608 stopped the minting of copper coins. The nominal copper currency minted in 1612
amounted to just 79,250 ducados, while no currency was minted between 1612 and July 1617.
Nevertheless, in 1617 King Philip III requested the Parliament its consent for the mint-
ing of new copper currency, but only to approved amounts (800,000 ducados in 1617 and
1,000,000 in 1618) since the seigniorage from it was inexcusably needed to finance the 1618
budget deficit (Gelabert, 1997, p. 55). In 1619, the Parliament forbade the coinage for the
currency minted had far exceeded the approved amounts. In fact, between July 1617 and
June 1621 the copper currency minted amounted to 5,041,167 ducados. However, one of the
first King Philip IV’s decrees (June 24, 1621) ordered, without Parliament’s approval, a new
copper coinage of 4,000,000 ducados. This large-scale program of minting copper that
started on July 3, 1617 was stopped by the decree of May 8, 1626. In between, the overall
copper currency minted had amounted to 22,580,531 ducados. When the minting of copper
was halted by the 1626 decree, the nominal stock of copper currency had reached almost 33
million ducados. As a consequence, it seems that Castilian monetary policy was dictated by
fiscal policy or, in other words, the Castilian government implemented a Ricardian FFMP in-
volving a fiscal dominance of the type claimed by the WFT. According with a 1623 official
statement quoted by Gelabert (1997: 69):
74 JOSÉ ISIDORO GARCÍA DE PASOCopper minting was the foundation, the most solid backing of budgetary operations;
given the current state of affairs, those operations would have been impossible without it.
The policy adopted by the Castilian government under King Philip III (1598-1621) and
in the first years of the reign of King Philip IV (1621-1626) through the issue of copper cur-
rency and mandatory restampings provoked the saturation of the demand for real monetary
balances by mid-1620s and largely displaced the full-bodied silver coins from domestic
monetary circulation 5.
Therefore, from mid-1620s onwards the Castilian economy became a fiat money one
since the intrinsic value of a copper coin (copper cost plus brassage) was almost three times
lower than its legal face value. Under those circumstances, subsequent issues of copper cur-
rency were inflationary. According to Hamilton’s (1934) price index (averaged for all
Castile), prices in copper maravedis rose by 3% per year between 1621 and 1625. In 1626
and 1627 those prices rose by 13% and 6%, respectively 6. Hamilton’s (1934) silver pre-
mium (averaged for all Castile) jumped from 1.04 in 1620 to 1.4627 in the second quarter of
1628. The daily Madrid series for silver premium reported by Cosme Micon (1668) 7 shows
that the silver premium rose from 1.04 as of January 1, 1620 to 1.84 on August 7, 1628.
On August 7, 1628 the government cried down all copper coins by a proportion of
one-half in order to either reduce or eliminate the silver premium 8. The results were the fol-
lowing. The nominal stock of money fell overnight by 50% and the silver premium dimin-
ished from 1.4627 to 1.1345 in the fourth quarter of 1628 according to Hamilton’s (1934)
data averaged for all Castile. It remained at that level until the third quarter of 1629 9.A c -
cording to Micon’s (1668) Madrid data, the silver premium fell overnight from 1.84 to 1.1
and remained at that level until February 1629.
The effects of the crydown were deflationary. It reversed the inflationary path of previ-
ous years and set the stage for a fall in prices expressed in copper maravedis. According to
Hamilton (1934), these prices (averaged for all Castile) fell from 1627 to 1635 at a 1.66% an-
nual rate. Overall, the price level fell by 13.32% 10.
Table 1 reports Hamilton’s annual prices (period 1601-1635). Table 2 reports Hamil-
ton’s silver premium quarterly data (period 1620 - 1635), while table 3 presents Micon’s sil-
ver premium end-of-quarter data (period 1618-1635). Table 4 reports the nominal stock of
copper money for the 1597-1635 period, together with the real stock of copper money, de-
flated by using the silver premium data (end-of-quarter figures, Hamilton’s data until 1618
and Micon’s data thereafter).
In an important paper and a recent book, Sargent and Velde (1999 and 2002, respec-
tively) present a commodity money model, a variant of which —what they call «the standard
formula without convertibility"— is used to interpret the Castilian monetary history in the
period prior to the 1628 crydown. Their cash-in-advance MT model explains why the
episodical huge increases of petty money issues (copper currency) pushed silver money out
of the Castilian monetary circulation by mid-1620s. The model also provides the rationale of
the 1628 crydown. In their words:
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undertaken by the government of Castile in the seventeenth century... In that experiment, a
conversion of full-bodied pennies [copper currency] to token..., led to a complete replace-
ment of the [silver] money supply with pennies [copper coins], followed by redenominations
as the government struggled to gain control of the price level.
The Sargent-Velde model incorporates demands for and supplies of two coins that differ
in denomination and in metal content. In the «Castilian» version of Sargent and Velde’s
model, there are silver reales and copper blancas. In addition, the government issues huge
quantities of copper blancas, which eventually lead to rising prices (in copper terms), to a
premium of silver maravedis in terms of copper maravedis and to the crowding-out of silver
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Table 1
Price Indexes, Average 1621-1630 = 100
Andalusia New Castile Old Castile All Castile
1601 93.91 84.05 94.31 90.76
1602 88.23 79.63 93.43 87.10
1603 93.68 79.03 91.75 88.15
1604 99.23 81.12 94.33 91.56
1605 98.22 86.69 96.76 93.89
1606 91.42 86.61 95.09 91.04
1607 91.28 84.81 91.87 89.32
1608 90.29 84.41 91.20 88.63
1609 89.29 80.96 80.13 83.46
1610 87.83 82.27 83.54 84.55
1611 80.67 79.95 83.06 81.23
1612 82.46 78.22 79.95 80.21
1613 83.66 82.92 79.50 82.03
1614 83.75 88.29 85.97 86.00
1615 81.43 84.17 83.84 83.15
1616 84.05 88.56 88.36 86.99
1617 84.63 89.98 86.89 87.17
1618 88.57 88.38 82.84 86.58
1619 82.79 80.62 84.94 82.78
1620 88.57 86.24 85.27 86.69
1621 ... 82.69 85.86 84.28
1622 90.08 89.48 83.21 87.59
1623 87.64 87.51 87.49 87.55
1624 88.78 93.24 95.52 92.51
1625 96.38 93.68 92.15 94.07
1626 113.39 107.74 102.13 107.75
1627 113.04 113.76 116.03 114.28
1628 110.61 109.17 117.12 112.30
1629 99.88 112.99 117.06 109.98
1630 99.79 109.69 106.64 105.37
1631 96.17 105.23 110.13 103.84
1632 100.60 111.43 108.10 106.71
1633 99.84 104.71 102.92 102.49
1634 96.10 107.39 99.84 101.11
1635 98.42 100.52 98.23 99.06
Source: Hamilton (1934), Table 25.from domestic monetary circulation. Once silver has disappeared, the Castilian economy be-
comes a standard cash-in-advance fiat currency one, with its price level being governed by a
copper currency quantity theory. In that situation, further issues of copper currency (in order
to raise seigniorage revenues for the government) result in rising prices (in copper terms) and
The 1628 Castilian crydown: A test of competing theories of the price level 77
Table 2
Silver premium (copper maravedis/silver maravedi), all Castile
1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
1620 1.0400 1.0458 1.0475 1.0383
1621 1.0371 1.0523 1.0406 1.0450
1622 1.0525 1.0561 1.0539 1.0632
1623 1.0829 1.0893 1.0930 1.1506
1624 1.1210 1.1191 1.1205 1.1298
1625 1.1707 1.1670 1.2100 1.2701
1626 1.3766 1.5000 1.5316 1.5241
1627 1.5150 1.4096 1.3975 1.4133
1628 1.4350 1.4627 1.4190 1.1345
1629 1.1345 1.1345 1.2013 1.1978
1630 1.1946 1.1938 1.2483 1.1903
1631 1.1780 1.1983 1.1885 1.1818
1632 1.1768 1.1831 1.1791 1.2010
1633 1.2095 1.2330 1.2351 1.2502
1634 1.2621 1.2798 1.2495 1.2604
1635 1.2831 1.2619 1.2466 1.2615
In addition, Hamilton reports the average silver premium to be 1 before 1603, 1.01 in 1603, 1.02 from 1604 to 1615,
1.01 in 1616, 1.02 in 1617-1618 and 1.03 in 1619.
Source: Hamilton (1934), Table 7.
Table 3
Silver premium (copper maravedis/silver maravedi), Madrid
1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
1618 1.0200 1.0200 1.0237 1.0237
1619 1.0275 1.0200 1.0375 1.0400
1620 1.0400 1.0400 1.0400 1.0400
1621 1.0400 1.0400 1.0525 1.0525
1622 1.0500 1.0550 1.0625 1.0700
1623 1.0750 1.0975 1.1150 1.1300
1624 1.1350 1.1550 1.1700 1.2105
1625 1.3600 1.4450 1.4800 1.5400
1626 1.7000 1.5100 1.5450 1.5300
1627 1.5000 1.5450 1.6500 1.6700
1628 1.7200 1.7700 1.1000 1.1000
1629 1.1200 1.1400 1.1600 1.2000
1630 1.2200 1.2600 1.2250 1.2050
1631 1.1800 1.1500 1.1200 1.1200
1632 1.1400 1.1600 1.1900 1.2200
1633 1.2300 1.2450 1.2600 1.2700
1634 1.2750 1.2850 1.2950 1.3000
1635 1.2800 1.2700 1.2600 1.2600
Source: Micon (1668) as reported by Serrano Mangas (1996).silver premiums. If the government tries to diminish both the price level and the silver pre-
mium, it can do so by reducing the nominal stock of copper currency through an overnight
crydown of the copper coins. Being the economy modelled by Sargent and Velde a standard
cash-in-advance fiduciary —copper— one without taking into account fiscal policy, if the
Castilian government cries down the copper currency, both the nominal copper money stock
and the current price level (in copper terms) should fall proportionately to the crydown, since
the demand for real copper money balances does not change. In other words, in the standard
cash-in-advance fiat currency Castilian version of the Sargent-Velde model, the price level
varies in proportion to the nominal money supply of copper (the MT), with that nominal sup-
ply being the only government liability affecting the price level.
Notwithstanding, as of 1628 the nominal stock of Castilian nominal government debt
outstanding was huge. Since Emperor Charles V’s reign there had been important issues of
long-term bonds, or juros, in order to finance secular budget deficits mostly related to war-
fare expenditures (though there are no accurate data on government’s expenditures and in-
comes —see Domínguez-Ortiz 1960 or Gelabert 1997—, from multiple official relations it
can be learnt that the government ran pervasive fiscal deficits 11 that should be covered by ei-
ther issues of floating debt (juros) or borrowing from private bankers (asentistas). Although
juros were essentially annuities, they came in a variety of types since some of them were life
annuities, others were perpetual, and still others were perpetual but redeemable by the gov-
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Table 4
Nominal and real stock of copper money in Castile (assuming a 1% annual depreciation),
end-of-year figures
Nominal Real Nominal Real
1597 2,996,336 2,996,336 1617 9,000,280 8,823,804
1598 3,051,384 3,051,384 1618 10,915,196 10,662,495
1599 3,188,733 3,188,733 1619 12,921,516 12,424,535
1600 3,272,025 3,272,025 1620 13,015,012 12,514,434
1601 3,460,284 3,460,284 1621 14,548,297 13,822,610
1602 3,720,468 3,720,468 1622 17,131,125 16,010,397
1603 4,472,310 4,428,030 1623 20,430,341 18,079,947
1604 8,230,638 8,608,653 1624 24,004,731 19,756,981
1605 8,989,996 8,813,721 1625 28,197,117 18,309,816
1606 9,429,301 9,244,413 1626 29,816,853 19,488,139
1607 9,681,900 9,492,059 1627 29,518,176 17,675,584
1608 9,621,335 9,432,681 1628 14,611,741 13,283,401
1609 9,525,119 9,338,352 1629 14,465,619 12,054,683
1610 9,428,865 9,244,966 1630 14,320,959 11,884,614
1611 9,335,564 9,152,514 1631 14,177,746 12,658,702
1612 9,321,158 9,138,390 1632 14,035,965 11,509,889
1613 9,227,944 9,047,004 1633 13,895,601 10,941,418
1614 9,135,662 8,956,531 1634 13,756,641 10,582,032
1615 9,044,303 8,866,964 1635 13,619,071 10,808,787
1616 8,953,957 8,865,205
Source: Author’s calculations based on data gathered from Hamilton (1934), Domínguez-Ortiz (1960), Motomura
(1997) and De Santiago (2000).ernment at any future date. Juros were bearer certificates and though there was an active
secondary market, almost all juros were owned by domestic Castilian residents
(Domínguez-Ortiz, 1960, Ch. 8; Conklin, 1998). Since the government honoured all its debts
in juros born by Castilian subjects before 1635 12, there should had been some credibility
mechanism that backed juros. Conklin (1996) provided an analysis of that enforcement
mechanism. According to him, there were three basic institutional features that bound the
government to repay domestic holders of juros: (i) the high political standing of most juro
bearers, (ii) the Castilian institutional structure that made these subjects indispensable to the
Crown, and (iii) the unfeasibility of a selective default due to the impossibility of knowing
which juros were born by influential subjects since juros were traded in an active secondary
market.
Juros were denominated in the unit of account, the maravedi. Thus, people could buy it
and the government could service it by paying legal tender money (copper, silver and gold
coins). However, once silver and gold had been driven almost out of domestic monetary cir-
culation and were exchanged at a premium, the government serviced its debt by paying cop-
per coins (indeed, since silver coins almost did not circulate in the 1620s and afterwards, the
bulk of tax revenues were collected in copper coins). Therefore, the Castilian government
debt as of 1628 can be considered as copper denominated (Domínguez-Ortiz, 1960, Ch. 8).
Koenigsberger (1958) has estimated the nominal stock of Castilian juros to be 20, 50,
and 100 million ducados in 1556, 1573, and 1598, respectively. Castillo-Pintado’s (1963) es-
timate for 1598 debt is 85 million ducados. Domínguez-Ortiz (1960, p. 325) has reported of-
ficial figures for the nominal interest paid on juros. Those yearly figures are: 4,634,293
ducados in 1598, 5,627,000 in 1623 and 6,418,746 in 1637. In addition, he (1960, p. 318) re-
ports the nominal stock of government debt amounting to 112 million ducados in 1623, ac-
cording to an information released to Parliament by the Castilian government. It can be seen
that, since the government debt paid a 5% nominal interest, 112 million ducados times 5%
equals 5.6 million ducados 13. Although in 1626 Parliament authorised the government to is-
sue an additional principal of 10 million ducados (Gelabert, 1997, pp. 74-75), most —if not
all— of these additional juros were issued after 1628 (Domínguez-Ortiz, 1960, p. 341;
Gelabert, 1997, p. 80). Thus, we can be confident that the figures for the nominal stock of
government debt (112 million ducados) and for the interest paid on it (5.6 million ducados
per year) are rather reliable and approximately constant for the period 1617-1628 14.
3. The Model
The model is designed to mimic the institutional features of the Castilian monetary sys-
tem as of 1628. It is a variant of the Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) overlapping generations
framework, modified to include perfect foresight, a representative household and copper cur-
rency, and to express the government’s FFMP in nominal terms in order to make it consistent
with our dataset. Therefore, it is a neo-classical intertemporal general equilibrium model
with full price flexibility.
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time horizon is infinite. The household obtains utility from a non-storable consumption good
and leisure. To acquire the consumption good the household must expend time in shopping.
The amount of time so spent depends positively on the volume of consumption but, for any
given volume, it is reduced by additional money holdings since these holdings facilitate
transactions. As a result, leisure in every period will be negatively related to consumption
and positively related to real money holdings. Thus, from a simple shopping time model a
utility function can be obtained where the household gets utility from the consumption good
and real money balances (Croushore, 1993). The government consumes, levies lump-sum
taxes, and issues copper money and government bonds.
In this economy, money consists of a coin —the blanca— made from copper. Copper
coins are produced by the government without costs, excluding the real cost of buying the
copper from a foreign country, which for simplicity we assume constant. The government
specifies the amount of copper in the blanca and, in turn, the real cost of coining it. The cur-
rency unit is an abstract unit of account —the maravedi— so that the money price of the con-
sumption good in period t (pt) is expressed in maravedis. The government also specifies the
legal face value of the blanca in terms of maravedis (e).
The household can use two financial devices if it desires to transfer wealth from the cur-
rent period to the next one. The first device is the storage of copper coins. The second
method is the purchase of interest-bearing government bonds.
The consumer
































ct+i: household’s consumption at period t+i
Mt+i: stock of circulating copper coins at the close of period t+i
eMt+i: nominal supply of copper currency at the close of period t+i
eMt+i/pt+i: real supply of copper currency at the close of period t+i
0 < [1/(1 + )] < 1: discount factor
Let Bt be the nominal stock of government bonds at the close of period t. At the begin-
ning of period t, a government bond yields a nominal interest equal to it–1. Thus, the repre-
sentative household’s budget constraint in nominal terms (maravedis) for period t is:
pt +e M t–1 +( 1+i t–1)Bt–1 =p tct +e M t +B t +T t [2]
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: constant endowment of the single non-storable good received every period by the
household
Tt: lump-sum tax in nominal terms
The household’s goal at period t is to choose values for ct and Mt, subject to its
intertemporal budget constraint so as to maximise its intertemporal utility function.
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The first-order conditions yield:


















where rt–1 is the real interest rate yielding a bond at the beginning of period t.


































































Each period the government consumes a fixed fraction g of the total endowment . Thus,
the government consumption in nominal terms is Gt = gpt. The government finances its ex-
penditures and the copper cost of making new coins with lump-sum taxes (Tt) government
bonds and gross seigniorage. Its period t budget constraint in nominal terms is:
it–1Bt–1 =e (Mt –M t–1) + (Bt –B t–1) +S t [8]
where:
e(Mt – Mt–1) is the period t nominal gross seigniorage
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zpt(Mt – Mt–1) is the period t nominal cost of minting new copper coins
St  Tt – Gt – zpt(Mt – Mt–1) is the period t primary budget surplus.
The real cost of copper coinage, zpt(Mt – Mt–1), is assumed to be a foreign country’s rev-
enue 16.
Assume that the government uses its primary budget surplus St to meet its debt obliga-
tion. It obeys the following Ricardian FMMP: a fraction 0  (1 – )  1 of the debt obliga-
tion in nominal terms, (1 + it–1)Bt–1, including principal and interest payments, is backed by
the nominal primary budget surplus. The remaining fraction 0 1 of the debt obligation
is backed by gross seigniorage 17.  = 0 corresponds to the polar budget surplus FFMP,
while  = 1 is the polar seigniorage FFMP.
Let t be the present discounted value of the nominal primary budget surplus from t to 	.
As a result,
t = (1–)(1+i t–1)Bt–1 [9]















(1–)(1+i t–1)Bt–1 =S t + (1–)Bt [11]
Rearranging:
St = (1–)[(1+i t–1)Bt–1 –B t] [12]
and
e(Mt –M t–1) = [(1+i t–1)Bt–1 –B t] [13]
These expressions show that the nominal primary budget surplus equals, each period,
(1-) times the difference between the current nominal interest obligation on the debt and a
term which corrects for the adjustment in the nominal stock of government debt. In addition,
gross seigniorage equals  times that difference.
Equilibrium
The representative household’s period t budget constraint in nominal terms is:
pt +e M t–1 + (1+i t–1)Bt–1 =p tct +e M t +B t +T t [14]


















































we find, after substituting and rearranging:
t = (1–)(1+r t–1)bt–1 – (1–)bt +g  +z (Mt –M t–1) [17]
























Consolidating the household’s budget constraint and the government’s budget con-
straint, we find the good market clearing condition:
ct = (1–g ) –z (Mt –M t–1) [22]
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   Substituting the market clearing condition into the above expression and rearranging yield:
[23]
Since Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) it is well known that monetary model economies have
a large number of equilibrium price paths. The conventional selection device is the bub-
ble-free or «fundamentals» device that rules out equilibria with purely speculative time
trends in velocity by choosing the stationary equilibrium price. We use this selection device
that does not include any self-justifying bubble or bootstrap components. Therefore, we look
for a stationary solution where the real interest rate is constant and given by rt–1 = rt = r.
Since ct–1 = [(1 + )(1 + rt)]ct, consumption is also constant: ct–1 = ct = c.
Thus:
[24]
In the equilibrium steady-state:
[25]















where BS and SR denote, respectively, the polar budget surplus and seigniorage FFMPs.
It can be seen that a MT relationship between money and the price level emerges only in
the polar BS case ( = 0). Otherwise, government bonds matter. Their influence on the price
level increases with , the commitment they represent to mint copper money. The resulting
anticipated rise in future currency minting associated with an increase in  lowers the current
demand for nominally denominated assets, which in turn induces a higher price level. Thus,
if gross seigniorage backs a positive fraction of the bond liability of the government, the
nominal stock of government debt matters for the price level determination.
The SFT argues that if the government’s FFMP is Non-Ricardian, the current price level
would be exclusively determined by the nominal stock of government bonds. This is so be-
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   cause the SFT uses a different device than both the MT and the WFT for selecting equilibria
from the continuum which can exist in monetary models, namely the fact that the govern-
ment’s intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied as an equilibrium condition.
4. Analysis of the 1628 crydown
The redenomination policy implemented overnight in 1628 by the Castilian government
provoked a fall of the legal face value of the copper currency e to one-half of the previous
one (e’ = 0.5e). In this sense, it corresponds exactly to the traditional conceptual experiment
of an overnight helicopter lift of purely fiat money, leaving untouched both the nominal
stock of government bonds and the stock of circulating copper coins.



























Now, the value of  must be found. As table 4 shows, from the beginning of the large-scale
issues of copper currency in 1597 to its halting in 1626, there were three very different phases,
all of them lasting about ten years. The first one (1597-1608) witnessed the issue of 7,297,710
ducados through the minting of new coins and the restamping of old ones. Between 1608 and
1617, the Castilian government decided to halt the copper coinage. Thus, there was no copper
minting, apart from a very small issue of 79,250 ducados in 1612. However, after almost ten
years of no copper issues, on July 3, 1617 the Castilian government decided the resumption,
with renewed energies, of the copper coinage. As a result, the nominal volume of copper
minted in the third phase (July 3, 1617-May 8, 1626) was more than three times larger than the
one issued in the first phase. 22,580,531 copper ducados were coined —the gross
seigniorage— and the net seigniorage obtained from that coinage amounted to 15,668,396
ducados. We assume that the value of  is the one obtained from the third phase copper issues.
Since the expression for gross seigniorage as a fraction of the government debt burden is
e(Mt –M t–1) = [(1+i t–1)Bt–1 –B t] [30]
and we are confident that that Bt–1  Bt = 112 million ducados in the period 1617-1628, while
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According to governmental sources and contemporary estimates (Domínguez-Ortiz,
1960), the nominal stock of copper currency before the 1628 crydown fell very likely in the
range 28-30 million ducados. As can be seen in table 4, our estimate is 29,816,853 ducados
at the end of 1626 by assuming 1% annual loss from wear and tear of coinage. Thus, as of
August 1628, the stock should have fallen to 29,346,119 ducados. If no depreciation is as-
sumed, our estimate just before the crydown is 32,957,491 ducados. Thus, we can be confi-
dent that the range 28-30 million ducados reported in official accounts at the time is very re-
liable.
Given our calibration of , the nominal stock of copper money, the nominal stock of
government debt and the annual interest burden from those juros, the deflationary effect on
the price level resulting from the WFT would be given by:
[31]
Therefore, since seigniorage had been backing more than one-third of the government
debt burden and the nominal stock of government bonds was four times higher than the nom-
inal stock of copper currency, the WFT predicts that the weight of the current nominal stock
of government debt on the current price level was heavier than the weight of the current
nominal stock of copper money. Thus, the 1628 crydown that diminished overnight the nom-
inal stock of copper money by a proportion of one-half should have reduced the current price
level by a proportion of one-fifth.
The MT corresponds to the polar budget surplus FFMP In such a case, the model pre-
dicts that the price level should have fallen by 50%. However, even in such a case, since in
the 1628 actual Castilian economy silver currency was still legal tender and there was free
coinage of silver, an effective floor to the fall in prices expressed in copper maravedis was
binding. If we use Hamilton’s data for all Castile, a [(1/1.4627) – 1] = 31.63% fall in prices
would have driven the silver premium to zero and a slightly larger fall would have triggered
the minting of silver coins and their return to the domestic monetary circulation, thus pre-
venting additional price falls. As a result, the 50% crydown would have reduced the price
level by about one-third. That effective floor to the fall in prices expressed in copper
maravedis would have been slightly larger than [1/1.84) – 1] = 45.65%, if Micon’s Madrid
silver premium data are used.
If we assume that the current price level chosen by both the MT and the SFT selection
devices is the same and that the government implements a surprising one-time decrease in
the money supply (i.e. a crydown), such a policy would have no immediate price-level ef-
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  fects, according to the SFT, because it does not affect neither the nominal stock of govern-
ment debt nor the real present value of budget surpluses, so that the current price level would
be unaffected. However, since the post-crydown SFT price level does not fall but the MT
equilibrium price decreases proportionally to the money supply reduction, the SFT predicts a
subsequent speculative hyperinflation.
Now, we can compare those theoretical effects on the price level resulting from the three
theories of the price level to the impact felt in practice. Using Hamilton’s (1934) and
Micon’s (1668) data for the silver premium before and after the redenomination, the over-
night impact on the price level can also be obtained. Indeed, since the model is a flexible
price one and silver coins were quoted in terms of copper coins in free markets, the immedi-
ate change of the silver premium after the redenomination decree is the true empirical mirror
of our theoretical expression [(p’/p) – 1] for prices expressed in copper maravedis 18.
Since the redenomination policy was implemented overnight on August 7, and Hamil-
ton’s quarterly silver premium data are averages of several observations during the quarter,
there are two relevant comparisons: the one between the third and fourth quarters and the one
between the second and fourth quarters. These actual impacts from the crydown on the silver
premium amounted, respectively, to –20,05% and –22,40%. In addition, we can obtain the
overnight impact on Madrid’s silver premium thanks to Micon’s daily data. Since the silver
premium fell from 1.84 on August 7 to 1.1 on August 8, its proportional fall amounted to
–40,22%.
Despite our theoretical model is free of price rigidities, another possibility would be to
look at actual commodity prices, like Hamilton’s ones reported in table 1. In order to get rid
of the likely effect of price rigidities, we have chosen to compare 1627 prices to 1635
prices 19. Therefore, table 5 shows other set of actual figures for the deflationary impact
caused by the 1628 redenomination.
Overall, the silver premium data show that the actual deflationary impact of the 1628
crydown fell approximately between 20% and 40%. The price index data suggests the mag-
nitude of such a deflationary impact falling between approximately 11% and 15%.
The WFT predicted effect falls within the interval for the silver premium and is stronger
than the actual impact computed from commodity prices. In addition, the actual impact
(whether on silver premium or commodity prices) was significantly smaller than the pre-
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Table 5
Actual deflationary impact on commodity prices, period 1628-1635
Andalusia New Castile Old Castile All Castile
–12.93% –11.64% –15.34% –13.32%
Source: Author’s calculations based upon Hamilton’s (1934) data.dicted one by the MT, the silver premium remained far away from unity and silver did not re-
turn to the domestic monetary circulation. Thus, we can conclude that data do not support the
MT. Finally, since prices fell immediately after the crydown and the economy did not suffer
a subsequent hyperinflation, data are also at odds with the SFT. Therefore, at this particular
historical episode, our findings provide evidence more favourable to the WFT than to both
the MT and the SFT.
5. Conclusion
There exist three theories of the price level which offer competing explanations of the
determinants of inflation. The traditional monetarist theory claims that inflation is always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. More recently, the fiscal theory of the price level
has provided a motivation for an empirical regularity linking the general price level and a
measure of government debt. This fiscal theory has two versions: the weak form version and
the strong form version. The former argues that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, but that
money growth is dictated by the fiscal authority in order to collect seigniorage. The latter
posits that even if money is constant, fiscal policy independently affects the price level.
We show how the three theories offer different explanations of the price level behaviour
after a once-and-for-all decrease in the money supply. We have then used the exceptional ex-
periment the Castilian government put forward in 1628 through the reduction of the legal
face value of all copper currency by a proportion of one-half in order to see which theory fits
better actual data.
At the time of implementing the crydown, the stock of nominal government debt and its
annual interest burden amounted to 112 million ducados and 5.6 million ducados, respec-
tively. In the eleven-year period prior to the crydown the Castilian government had issued
22.6 million copper ducados in order to obtain seigniorage so that, as of 1628, the nominal
stock of copper currency had reached about 30 million ducados. As a result, gross
seigniorage through the minting of copper currency had backed about 36.7% of the interest
burden of government debt. Therefore, according to the weak form fiscal theory, the weight
of anticipated copper issues —to raise future seigniorage— on the current price level was
about 60%, being about 40% the weight of the current nominal copper stock. Thus, a
redenomination policy that reduced the legal face value of copper currency by a proportion
of one-half while leaving unaltered the nominal stock of government debt could just provoke
a reduction of the price level by a proportion of one-fifth. The monetarist theory predicts a
50% decrease of the price level, but since silver could be freely coined in the Castilian econ-
omy, there existed a floor to the price level decrease (about one-third). The strong form fiscal
theory predicts an unaffected price level followed by a hyperinflation.
Existing data shows that in an economy like the Castilian one as of 1628, with a long
path of monetization of budget deficits and a heavy burden of interest-bearing government
debt, the weak form fiscal theory provides a better explanation of the price level behaviour
after the crydown than both the monetarist theory and the strong form fiscal theory.
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1. The labels WFT, SFT, and MT have been borrowed from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999).
2. Though they were no purely token coins. According to Motomura (1994), the legal face value of a Castilian
copper coin was almost three times higher than its intrinsic value.
3. Details can be found in Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) or McCallum (1998).
4. From 1535 onwards the ducado had no longer been a gold coin, but it retained its role as a unit of account,
worth 375 maravedis.
5. An anonymous commentator estimated as of July 1625 the fraction «circulating silver money to circulating
copper money» to be very small, about 1.6 percent (Manuscript 6731, p. 84, Spanish National Library). In ad-
dition, Hamilton (1934) and Urgorri (1950) report some anecdotal evidence on the rarity of circulating silver
coins by mid-1620s. They also report that before early 1620s prices were quoted in maravedis, while they be-
came quoted in copper maravedis after that.
6. Hamilton's data pertain to the three Castilian provinces: Andalusia, New Castile and Old Castile. In Andalusia,
prices in copper maravedis rose by 2% per year between 1622 and 1625. In 1626 Andalusian prices rose by
18% and they remained more or less constant in 1627. In New Castile prices rose by 3% per year between
1621 and 1625, and they rose by 15% and by 6% in 1626 and 1627, respectively. The same data for Old Casti-
le are, respectively, 2%, 11%, and 14%.
7. Manuscript 18433, pp. 126-133, Spanish National Library, Madrid. The series has recently been published by
Serrano Mangas (1996). Madrid is a town inside New Castile. The discrepancies between Hamilton’s series
for New Castile and Micon’s series are due to the fact that the former was mainly based upon Toledo quota-
tions, a town located 43 miles southwest Madrid.
8. The crydown order was published in Andalusia (Seville) on August 11.
9. The silver premium in Andalusia was 1.445 in the second quarter, 1.6 in the third quarter and fell to 1.1275 in
the fourth quarter of 1628. The figures for New Castile were, respectively, 1.4733, 1.345, and 1.176. The figu-
res for Old Castile were 1.47, 1.312, and 1.1, respectively.
10. The figures for Andalusia were 1.62% yearly and 12.93% overall. The figures for New Castile were 1.45%
yearly and 11.64% overall. The figures for Old Castile were 1.92% yearly and 15.34% overall.
11. Thomson (1976) presents fiscal data for selected years between 1559 and 1621. For instance, total fiscal ex-
penditures in 1621 amounted to 12.69 million ducados (of which 5.6 million were interest paid on government
debt), whereas total fiscal income amounted to 10.52 million ducados, i.e. a government deficit of about 2.15
million ducados.
12. Apart from 214,000 ducados of the interest paid in 1625 in order to save funds to help the city of Cadiz which
was menaced by an English squadron. To compensate the bearers, they were given new juros.
13. In 1618, the government lowered the nominal interest rate paid on juros from 7,14% to 5% per year.
14. Domínguez-Ortiz (1960) guesses the ratio government’s income/national income to be around 11%.
15. In the 1620s and before the 1628 crydown, e  3zpt. After the crydown, e’ = 0.5e  1.5zpt.
16. In the 1620s, the Castilian government bought copper mainly from Sweden.
17. Observe that this FFMP is a Ricardian one since it imposes that the government's infinite-horizon budget cons-
traint holds with equality for all prices. The present discounted value of the primary surplus backs a fraction of
the debt obligation, while the complementary fraction is backed by the present discounted value of seigniora-
ge. As a result, the debt obligation is fully backed by the present discounted value of government net revenues
(including seigniorage).
18. Note that silver coins were still legal tender and that their legal face value did not change (in fact, it remained
unaltered between 1497 and 1643). Thus, the overnight copper crydown neither modified the purchasing po-
wer of silver coins nor the price level expressed in silver maravedis. As a result, a change in the silver pre-
The 1628 Castilian crydown: A test of competing theories of the price level 89mium just reflected the change in the purchasing power of the copper coins or, in other words, the change in
the price level.
19. After the 1628 crydown, there were no major shocks that could affect the inflation measure until a new min-
ting programme of copper money that started in May 1636. That is why we have chosen the 1635 price level.
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Resumen
El 7 de agosto de 1628, el gobierno de Castilla decretó la reducción a la mitad del valor nominal de la moneda de ve-
llón circulante. En este trabajo se sostiene que este experimento histórico similar a un drenaje homogéneo de dinero
en toda la economía es interesante para contrastar la relevancia empírica de diversas teorías del nivel de precios. El
experimento muestra que la evolución predecible del nivel de precios posterior a la redenominación prevista a partir
de la versión débil de la teoría fiscal del nivel de precios (la llamada teoría de Sargent-Wallace) se ajusta mejor a los
datos que las evoluciones predecibles a partir de la versión fuerte de esa teoría fiscal y de la teoría cuantitativa del di-
nero (la denominada teoría monetarista).
Palabras clave: devaluación, teoría monetarista, versión débil de la teoría fiscal, versión fuerte de la teoría fiscal.
Clasificación JEL: E31, E42, E63, E65, N13.
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